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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980235-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
JEFFREY D. MECHAM, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from two convictions of aggravated 
robbery, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court, which has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (1996) (R. 212). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial or 
a continuance for an alleged discovery violation where the prosecutor did not violate any 
discovery rules and where, even assuming a violation, the defendant suffered no prejudice? 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a requested mistrial or continuance based 
on a claimed discovery violation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Knight 734 
P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 1987); State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App. 1997); see also 
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393,401 (Utah 1994) (holding no abuse of discretion in denying 
mistrial where not prejudice shown), cert, denied.. 513 U.S. 115 (1995); State v. Price. 909 
P.2d 256, 262 (Utah App. 1995) (stating that "[a] trial court has discretion to grant or deny 
a motion for mistrial and its decision will remain undisturbed absent an abuse of that 
discretion"), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1998), is reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an October 3, 1995 information with two counts of 
aggravated robbery (R. 10). A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 156-57; 225:255). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive five-to-life prison terms to run 
consecutively to prison terms that defendant was already serving (R. 201, 203). The court 
also imposed two one-year firearm enhancements, each to run consecutively to its respective 
underlying sentence (R. 202, 204). Defendant timely appealed his convictions (R. 205). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and his accomplice robbed the Raging Waters water park of approximately 
$20,000 at gunpoint. To facilitate their getaway, the robbers also took the car of one of the 
employees. The following details are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. 
State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350. 351 (Utah 1996). 
" Where do they keep the money? " 
Oscar Contreras arrived early on Sunday morning, July 16, 1995, for his first day as 
a lifeguard at Raging Waters (R. 224:112).1 As Oscar walked towards the entrance, he was 
approached by two men attired as Raging Waters lifeguards, in red shorts, white or grayish 
shirts, dark sunglasses, and sandals (R. 224:90, 114, 128-29; 225:184-85, 196). One of the 
men was shorter and stockier than the other, wore a fake mustache, and had his hair in a 
ponytail pulled up under a hat (R. 224:50, 75-76, 99-100, 114-15, 129; 225:185, 187-88). 
The other man, who was blond, thin, and taller, was unshaven and wore a hooded sweatshirt 
with the hood down (R. 224:50, 76-77, 90, 95, 99-100, 114; 225:185, 187-88, 196). 
The men asked Oscar if he worked there (R. 224:114). When Oscar said that he did, 
the stockier man pulled out a gun, pointed it at Oscar's face, and demanded, "Where do they 
keep the money?" (R. 224:115). Because Oscar did not know, the two men escorted him 
*Oscar testified that he arrived to work at about 7:00 a.m., however, the testimony 
of other witnesses indicates that the lime was more likely sometime between 8:00 and 
8:30 a.m. (R. 224:112, 47, 70-71, 73, 86, 127-28; 225:184-85, 196). 
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toward the office buildings (R. 224:115). As they neared the buildings, they encountered 
Lou Livolsi, the general manager, and Channing Jones, the operations manager (R. 224:128-
29; 225:185, 185-86). The stocky robber pointed his gun at Lou and Channing, again 
demanding to be taken to the cash room (R. 224:130; 225:186). 
"A learning experience " 
Because neither Lou nor Channing had a key to the cash room, they asked Dave 
Peterson, a passing employee, to find Jill Pittman, the income manager (R. 224:48,130-31; 
225:187, 229). Jill thought it a "little odd" that Lou did not have his own keys to the cash 
room, but followed Dave to the five waiting men (R. 224:48-49; 225:187, 229). Lou asked 
Jill to open the cash room for them (R. 224:49). Jill, who did not see the gun, acquiesced, 
believing that the two robbers were there to fix the sprinkling system and therefore needed 
access to the control box located inside the cash room (R. 224:49). 
The two robbers, Lou, Channing, Oscar, Jill, and Dave, all walked to the cash room, 
which was located nearby behind the wave pool (R. 224:46, 69, 51, 117-18, 131, 188). Jill 
unlocked the outer door and held it open while the others entered (R. 224:55). Inside was 
a separate vault room, with a cashier's window and a second door (R. 224:86, 87-88; State's 
Exhibits 7, 8, 9). 
Seventeen-year-old Janea Jones was sitting inside the vault room preparing a deposit 
when she saw the others enter the outer door (R. 224:55, 70, 85-88; 225:188-89). As 
required by standard procedure, Janea immediately jumped up, shut the vault and the door 
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to the vault room, and returned to her deposit (R. 224:55, 87-88). Like Jill, Janea assumed 
that the men needed to access the sprinkler controls, located just outside the vault room (R. 
224:88). 
Lou, however, asked the still unsuspecting Jill to unlock the vault room door (R. 
224:57-58). Although allowing lifeguards into the vault room was unusual, Janea did not 
look up, but continued working on her deposit (R. 224:58, 88-89). She assumed that 
everything was all right because Jill and Lou were there (R. 224:88). 
Jill and Janea realized for the first time that they were being robbed when the two 
robbers ordered Jill to "empty out the vault into some duffle bags" (R. 224:58, 89). When 
Jill looked confused, the robbers told her "this [is] just a learning experience, an exercise" 
(R. 224:58). Jill continued to hesitate until Lou told her that he would help (R. 224:58). 
"I looked at him for a good period of time in the camera " 
As Lou and Jill began filling duffle bags with money, the stocky robber tapped Janea 
on the back of her head with his gun (R. 224:89, 135). Janea, who was still sitting at the 
desk, turned to find the gun pointing at her (R. 224:89). Janea then looked up into the 
robber's face who ordered her to not look at his face and to go stand by the others (R. 
224:89). Janea continued to stare at the robber's face for a moment, but then walked towards 
the other employees (R. 224:89). As she did so, Janea looked at the thinner robber, who was 
placing wrist cuffs on one of the employees (R. 224:90). 
By this time, the thinner man had produced a gun and both robbers had donned latex 
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gloves (R. 224:59, 90, 92, 102, 133). They lined up all the employees, except Lou and Jill, 
"execution style facing the wall with [their] hands [tied] behind [their] back[s] and duct tape 
over [their] mouths" (R. 224:89, 58-59, 63, 137; 225:189, 231). 
As the duffle bags became full, the thinner robber would take them outside the cash 
room and return for more (R. 224:92, 136). Whenever the robber came back, Janea could 
see him "for awhile" through a video camera placed outside the cash room door (R. 224:91 ).2 
Although Janea was very frightened and did not know "whether or not [she] was going to 
live to be 18," she watched the video camera, "staring" and "looking" at the thinner robber 
"for a good period of time in the camera" (R. 224:91). 
After collecting between $20,000 and $25,000 in cash, the robbers tied up Lou and 
Jill next to the others, took Oscar's car keys, and warned the employees to not call police and 
to wait ten minutes before coming out (R. 224:60, 63, 64-65, 93, 120, 134-35, 136, 
137;225:191). As soon as the outer door shut, however, Jill and Dave, with wrists still tied, 
managed to phone police while the others found a pair of scissors and began cutting each 
other's wrist cuffs (R. 224:65, 94, 137). 
Oscar's car was found locked a few blocks away (R. 224:121). The car was dusted 
for fingerprints, but none were matched to defendant or his accomplice (R. 224:125, 153, 
158,169,171-72). 
2There was no video tape in the camera to record the robbery (R. 224:72). 
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Channing and Oscar identify the robbers from a photo array 
After the robbery, both Channing and Oscar assisted police in creating a composite 
drawing of both robbers (R. 224:121, 159-60,192).3 A few weeks later, Channing notified 
police that he had seen a picture of one of the robbers (R. 225:194). Subsequently, a 
detective showed Channing two photo arrays, each containing six photographs (R. 224:161-
63). Channing identified defendant as the blond, thin robber from one array and Philip 
Hollen as the heavier robber from the other array (R. 224:161-63, 164; 225:192, 193, 197). 
Police also showed Oscar a photo array from which he identified Philip Hollen as the shorter, 
stockier robber (R. 224:126, 164).4 
Lou was also shown a photo array (R. 224:138). Although he was unable to identify 
the blond robber, he made a positive identification of the heavier one (R. 224:138-39). Lou 
also identified the heavier robber at a subsequent lineup (R. 224:139). 
Based on Channing's and Oscar's identifications, police arrested defendant for the 
robbery (R. 10; 224:163). 
The lineup 
A lineup was conducted at defendant's request on October 16,1996, over a year after 
3Channing helped with the drawing the same day as the robbery, while Oscar 
helped about two weeks later on July 28, 1995 (R. 224:159, 160, 192). 
4Oscar also picked a photograph as that of the thinner robber, but it is not clear 
from the record whether that photo was of defendant (R. 224:121-22, 123, 126, 162-63). 
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the robbery and arrest (R. 10,14-26,29; 224:71; Defendant's Exhibit 17).5 There were seven 
participants, all of whom were chosen by defendant (R. 14-26; 224:72; Add. B). All the 
participants wore shorts, a hooded sweatshirt, and dark sunglasses (R. 224:81). Although the 
blond, thinner robber's hood was down during the robbery, all the lineup participants wore 
their hoods up over their heads (R. 224:78, 80-81; 90; 94; 99; 143). Defendant stood in 
position two (R. 224:39). 
All six of the Raging Waters employees attended the lineup (R. 224:71-72; 94; Add. 
B). Each was provided a blue card and instructed that if they recognized the blond, thinner 
robber in the lineup, they should write the position number of that person on the face of the 
blue card (R. 224:103-04; Add. B). However, if the employees were not sure, but thought 
they recognized the robber, they were to write the number of that person on the back of the 
blue card (R. 224:10; Add. B). If the employees did not recognize anyone in the lineup, they 
were told to put a zero on the front of the card (R. 224:104; Add. B). 
Janea initially wrote a zero on the front of her card, but then erased it and wrote a "2" 
on the back (R. 224:104-05; Add. B at 23; Defendant's Exhibit 20). Oscar wrote a "2" and 
a "7" on the back of his card (Add. B at 23). Jill, Charming, and Dave all wrote numbers 
other than "2" on the backs of their cards (R. 224:81; 225:198-99; Add. B at 23; Defendant's 
Exhibits 18, 30), and Lou placed a "0" on the front of his card (Add. B. at 23; Defendant's 
5Defense Exhibit 17, the transcript of the lineup, is reproduced in Addendum B and 
will hereafter be referred to as "Add. B." 
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Exhibit 21). Channing and Lou were unable to identify defendant at trial, although Lou did 
state that defendant had "similar features" to one of the robbers (R. 224:139, 147-48; 
225:198). Dave did not testify (R. 224, 225). 
Oscar identifies defendant in court 
At the preliminary hearing, Oscar identified defendant as the blond, thinner robber, 
(R. 224:122). Oscar again positively identified defendant at trial (R. 224:122). 
Janea positively identifies defendant at trial 
At trial, on direct examination, Janea positively identified defendant as one of the 
robbers (R. 224:95). She acknowledged that she had started to write "zero" on the front of 
her blue card, but explained, "At first I couldn't tell between 2 and 7. But then when I 
looked a little longer, it was 2" (R. 224:104-05). Janea stated that her initial hesitancy 
resulted from the hoods being up and interfering with her "profile view" (R. 224:94-95,98-
99). Janea explained that because the hood was down during the robbery, she was able to 
get "a good profile look when we were being robbed" (R. 224:95, 99). "If they had taken 
their hoods off," Janea testified, "I could have given a hundred percent identification" (R. 
224:95). Not wanting to "falsely accuse someone," and not knowing that she could have 
asked that the hoods be taken down during the lineup, Janea placed the "2" on the back of 
the card instead of the front (R. 224:105-06). Now, without a hood blocking her view, Janea 
was positive that defendant was one of the robbers (R. 224:95). 
On cross-examination, Janea denied discussing her lineup identification with 
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investigators (R. 224:108). The following exchange ensued between defense counsel and 
Janea: 
Q: And did there come a time after the lineup that you spoke with the 
prosecutor about who you had identified? 
A: Today. 
Q: And was that before court? 
A: It was. He asked me if I could identify the man I had seen in here as being 
the suspect, because I told him the only thing I was unsure of was the hood 
being on. 
Q: And did he show you a photograph of the person? 
A: No, he didn't. I had seen him when we came over here for juror selection. 
Q: So, the prosecutor brought you over and you sat in here and looked at the person 
who was on trial here? 
A: I did. That's when I got the profile view that I wanted at the initial — 
whatever — lineup. 
(R. 224:108). (A partial transcript of Janea's testimony is reproduced in Addendum C). 
JillPittman's testimony 
On direct examination, Jill generally described the two robbers and the robbery (R. 
224:48-50, 58-65). The prosecutor did not directly ask Jill if she could identify defendant 
as one of the robbers, but at the end of direct examination asked, "Now, you have seen the 
defendant, Mr. Mecham, in the courtroom here today. How does he fit the general 
description of the person that you saw on the date of the robbery?" (R. 224:66). Jill replied, 
io 
"Well, his hair is a bit shorter. He is clean shaven. He's a little heavier than two and a half 
years ago. But his basic characteristics, he fits exactly" (R. 224:66). 
On cross-examination, Jill stated that she had met with the prosecutor that morning 
and that they had reviewed the day the robbery happened and photographs of the scene (R. 
224:66-67). Jill denied having ever been shown any photographs of persons or potential 
suspects (R. 224:67,71). In response to defense counsel's questions, Jill stated that she had 
difficulty at the lineup because "they had all these gentlemen wear their hooded sweat shirts 
with the hat on and it was hard to recognize because that was not how I saw him" (R. 
224:78). Defense counsel then asked Jill if she had recognized anyone in the lineup as one 
of the robbers (R. 224:80). Jill responded that "it doesn't look like it. It says if you think but 
you are not sure, put the number on the back. And that's what I did" (R. 224:80). Jill 
explained that she wrote on the back "a number for a person that [she] thought might be 
similar," because "like I said, it was very hard to tell with the hoods up" (R. 224:80-81). * 
Jill acknowledged that at the time of the lineup she did not tell the prosecutor or any 
investigator that the robber did not have his hood up during the robber (R. 224:78), but stated 
that she did tell the prosecutor this fact on the morning of trial (R. 224:78). 
On re-direct, after the prosecutor confirmed that each of the lineup participants had 
their hoods up and wore dark sunglasses, Jill testified as follows: 
Q (by prosecutor): Now, as [you are] sitting in court here today and you have had a 
chance to observe the defendant, does that stir your recollection any more? 
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A: Oh, yes. 
Q: Do you have any question now as to who that person was that committed the 
robbery? 
A: No, I do not. There are certain features, such as his nose and his bones right here, 
his cheeks, that really make me know for sure that this was the guy that was there. 
(R. 224:82). 
On re-cross, Jill reiterated that based on the jaw bone and cheeks, "when [defendant] 
looks at me, I know that it's him" (R. 224:83). Jill was then excused without objection (R. 
224:84). (A partial transcript of Jill's testimony is reproduced in Addendum D). 
Defendant moves for mistrial or continuance 
Jill and Janea testified first and second respectively (R. 224:45,84). At the conclusion 
of their testimony, they were both excused without objection (R. 224:84, 109). They were 
followed that day by four other state's witnesses (R. 224:109, 127, 149, 154, 173). 
The following morning, on the second day of trial, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial alleging that the prosecutor had engineered a "post charge pretrial identification 
which was put on the record as of yesterday" (R. 225:179). Defense counsel complained that 
the first two witnesses, Jill and Janea, had made a positive identification of his client at trial 
even though they had been unable to do so at the lineup (R. 225:179). Counsel claimed that 
it was clear from Janea's testimony that the prosecutor had sent her "over to the courthouse 
to look at [defendant] for purposes of identification," and that the in-court identifications of 
defendant by Jill and Janea were the direct result of this surreptitious "post charge pretrial 
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identification" procedure (R. 224:179-80). 
The prosecutor denied that he had "contrived" a pretrial lineup or that he had 
"directed" Janea or Jill to come early to the courthouse for the purpose of identifying 
defendant (R. 225:181-82). The prosecutor explained that the only time Jill or Janea had 
been present was during jury selection so that potential jurors could determine whether or not 
they knew any of the witnesses (R. 225:180). The prosecutor observed that although defense 
counsel was, or least should have been, aware of the witnesses' presence during jury 
selection, he made no objection to their presence (R. 225:181). The prosecutor also pointed 
out that Janea had already made a tentative identification of defendant at the lineup and that 
she simply explained to the jury about her prior hesitancy and why she could now make a 
positive identification (R. 225:181-82). With respect to Jill's identification, the prosecutor 
noted that he did not even ask her if she could actually identify defendant until after it 
became clear on cross-examination that she might be able to (R. 225:181). 
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, stating, 
I am not persuaded, based on what's been presented to me and my recollection 
of the testimony of the witness in question, that there was a surreptitious 
attempt by the prosecution to get an identification without the knowledge of 
defense counsel. 
These young ladies were in the courtroom prior to the start time of the 
trial. They were awaiting the selection of the jury. And I have no reason to 
think that [the prosecutor] was directing them to speed over here and get a look 
at the defendant to identify him. 
(R. 225:182). 
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Defense counsel then moved for a continuance, stating, "I was surprised to find out 
that the witnesses came into the courtroom, looked at my client, made the identification and 
then left prior to trial" (R. 225:183). Counsel stated that he needed a continuance so that he 
"could find and call a qualified expert to testify about the effect of pretrial corporal 
identifications" (R. 225:183). The prosecutor responded that as the two witnesses would 
have seen defendant anyway when they testified, their seeing him earlier that morning would 
not have affected their testimony (R. 225:183). 
The trial court denied the motion to continue (R. 225:183). (A transcript of 
defendant's motions and the trial court's rulings is reproduced in Addendum E). 
Defendant's alibi 
Defendant testified that between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. on the day of the robbery, he was 
having breakfast with his friend Philip Hollen, the man positively identified by Oscar, 
Channing, and Lou as the heavier robber (R. 225:204, 205, 206, 207). Defendant claimed 
that after breakfast he and Hollen drove up to see the Jordanelle Dam (R. 225:203-04, 206). 
Defendant's sister testified that she believed defendant was home at about 9:15 a.m. 
that morning because she could smell cigarette smoke coming from the side of the house 
where defendant generally smoked (R. 225:211,213,214). The sister did not see defendant 
that morning, however, and she testified that her other sister also smoked in that same area 
(R. 225:211). She also conceded that she did not have a watch or clock at the time she 
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smelled smoke and that she was only estimating the time (R. 225:213, 214).6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions for 
a mistrial or a continuance. Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed a discovery 
violations by "arranging" for two witnesses to view his client during jury selection so that 
they could positively identify him at trial and by not informing defendant before trial that 
these two witnesses could now positively identify him, even though they had been unable to 
do so at a lineup. Defendant argues that the unanticipated identifications impaired his 
defense. 
Defendant's assertions of a discovery violation are not supported in the record. First, 
the trial court expressly rejected defendant's claim that the prosecutor engineered an 
improper "post charge showup" during jury selection. Second, there is no evidence in the 
record that the prosecutor failed to disclose any evidence of which he had knowledge or that 
he made any inaccurate or misleading representations regarding any testimony. In the 
absence of any discovery violations, there was no basis for a mistrial or continuance and the 
trial court properly denied defendant's motions. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a discovery violation did occur, 
6Even if one assumes that defendant was home at 9:15 a.m., based on the times 
given by the employees, defendant would have had time to commit the robbery and be 
home by 9:15 a.m. (R. 224:47, 61, 70-71, 73, 86, 93, 112, 119, 127-28; 225:184-85, 190, 
196,216,235). 
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defendant has not made a credible argument that such a violation impaired his defense. 
Moreover, defendant suffered no prejudice from the unanticipated identifications because 
two other witnesses positively identified him and because defendant's own alibi for the time 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL OR 
CONTINUANCE BECAUSE THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED 
NO DISCOVERY VIOLATION AND, EVEN ASSUMING A 
VIOLATION, DEFENDANT SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE. 
On appeal, defendant alleges two discovery violations by the prosecutor. He first 
asserts that the prosecutor violated rule 16(h), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by 
conducting a "post charge showup" just before trial without notifying defendant or his 
counsel. Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. Aplt.] at 10-11. Defendant secondly alleges that 
the prosecutor violated rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by not informing 
defense counsel before trial that Jill Pittman and Janea Jones could now positively identify 
defendant. Br. Aplt. 12-14. Defendant argues that these two violations impaired his defense 
and that he was therefore entitled to a mistrial or, at the very least, a continuance. Br. Aplt. 
13-14, 157-17. 
The record does not support defendant's claims of a discovery violation or that his 
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defense was impaired by any alleged violation. Moreover, even assuming that a violation 
did occur, defendant suffered no prejudice. 
A. The trial court properly found that the prosecutor did not conduct a post charge showup 
and therefore did not violate rule 16(h), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 16(h), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[sjubject to 
constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: (1) appear in a lineup; (2) speak 
for identification; . . . [and] (4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the 
crime." That subsection also provides that "whenever the personal appearance of the accused 
is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such 
appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(h) (1998). 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor in effect conducted a post charge showup 
without giving notice to him by bringing Janea into the courtroom specifically to look at 
defendant during jury selection.7 Br. Aplt. 7, 10. Without setting forth any analysis or 
authority, defendant concludes that this violated rule 16(h) and that he was therefore entitled 
to a mistrial."8 Br. Aplt. 10-11. 
Defendant's assertion that the prosecutor arranged a showup during jury selection is 
7Both below and on appeal, defendant's assertion of a showup appears to be 
directed only at Janea and not at Jill, although the trial court appears to have addressed 
the issue with respect to both women . Br. Aplt. 7, 8, 11; (R. 225:178-80, 182). 
Significantly, rule 16(h) does not state what remedy is appropriate when a 
defendant and his counsel are not given reasonable notice of a post-charge identification 
procedure, although it does provide for various sanctions against the defendant for failing 
to appear or comply with the requirements of this rule. Utah R. Crim. P. 16(h). 
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without any support in the record. In fact, the trial court expressly rejected this allegation 
when defendant moved for a mistrial, finding that although both Jill and Janea were in the 
courtroom before trial, they were merely awaiting the selection of the jury (R. 225:182). The 
trial court found no evidence that the prosecutor had surreptitiously tried to get an 
identification of defendant without the knowledge of defense counsel or that the prosecutor 
had directed either witness to come early simply so that they could "get a look at the 
defendant to identify him" (R. 225:182). Defendant does not challenge the trial court's oral 
findings on this point, nor argue that they are clearly erroneous. State v. A House and 1.37 
Acres. 886 P.2d 534, 538 n.4 (Utah 1994) (declining to review findings not specifically 
challenged or not shown to be clearly erroneous); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232,1236 (Utah 
App. 1995) (accepting as correct factual findings not challenged on appeal); State v. Wright 
893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah App. 1995) (a trial court's factual findings will not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous). Indeed, he does not even mention the trial court's findings. Br. 
Aplt. 8, 10. Thus, defendant has not shown that the prosecutor violated rule 16(h). 
More to the point is that defendant has not explained how witnesses viewing him in 
the courtroom before trial, even at the prosecutor's request, amounts to a "showup"or 
"lineup"for purposes of rule 16(h). See State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 655 (Utah App.) 
(explaining that "showup" typically takes place during investigative stage and serves purpose 
of allowing victim or witness to immediately identify whether person in custody is actually 
person who committed crime), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Defendant also has 
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not explained how seeing him in the courtroom immediately before trial had any impact on 
Jill's or Janea's ability to identify him. Even if the witnesses had not seen defendant 
immediately before trial, they certainly would have seen him without a hood during their trial 
testimony, at which time they would have been able to positively identify him. Thus, neither 
Janea's nor Jill's testimony would have been unfairly affected by viewing defendant during 
jury selection. 
In short, the prosecutor did not conduct an improper "post-charge identification 
procedure" in violation of rule 16(h). The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion 
in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial on that ground.9 
B. Defendant has not shown that the prosecutor violated rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor violated rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, because he did not inform defense counsel before trial that Janea and Jill would 
be able to positively identify defendant at trial even though they had been unable to do so at 
the lineup. Br. Aplt. 10, 12-13. 
9Defendant also contends that the alleged post-charge showup violated a myriad of 
his constitutional rights, including his right to a fair trial, his Sixth Amendment right to 
have counsel present at post-charge identification procedures, and various federal and 
state due process claims. Br. Aplt. 19-23. These claims lack a factual predicate, 
however, because, as explained, there was no improper post-charge showup. 
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Rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires a prosecutor to disclose to the 
defense 
(a) . . . upon request the following material or information of which [the 
prosecutor] has knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or co-
defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree 
of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a) (1998) (emphasis added). If a prosecutor voluntarily discloses 
inculpatory evidence under subsection (a)(5), he or she must comply "fully and forthrightly," 
producing all the requested material, or identifying those portions not disclosed. State v. 
Kaiiin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-17 (Utah 1987). 
Once evidence is disclosed under this rule, the prosecution has "a continuing obligation to 
disclose newly acquired information so as to avoid misleading the defense." Kaiiin, 877 P.2d 
at 143: accord State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393.400 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 
(1995); Knight, 734 P.2d at 916-17; State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). If a 
prosecutor violates his or her duty under rule 16(a), the trial court may fashion a remedy 
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under rule 16(g).10 Menzies. 889 P.2d at 401. 
Before trial, defendant made a formal written discovery request under rule 16(a) for 
certain inculpatory information, including any statements by eyewitnesses regarding their 
identification of the robbers (R. 39, 40, 54-55). The prosecution voluntarily responded to 
those requests, providing defendant with all information in its possession, including police 
reports and copies of the photo arrays presented to witnesses (R. 45, 47, 64-67). Thus, the 
prosecutor in this case had a continuing duty to disclose to the defense newly acquired 
inculpatory evidence. See Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143. 
Nevertheless, defendant has not shown that the prosecutor violated that duty here 
because there is no evidence that the prosecutor failed to disclose any evidence of which he 
had knowledge with respect to Jill's testimony or that Janea's in-court identification 
constituted a change from her lineup identification. 
JilFs testimony. Defendant alleges, in effect, that the prosecutor discovered the 
morning of trial that although Jill had been unable to identify defendant at the lineup, she was 
now able to do so after seeing defendant in the courtroom during jury selection. Defendant 
argues that the prosecutor had a continuing obligation under rule 16(a) to immediately 
l0Rule 16(g) provides: 
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, 
the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence 
not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under 
the circumstances. 
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disclose this "change" in Jill's ability to identify him, so as to avoid misleading him. 
Defendant asserts that the failure to comply with this obligation required the court to grant 
either a mistrial or his request for a continuance. Br. Aplt. 12-14, 15-16. 
Rule 16(a), however, only imposes a duty of disclosure on a prosecutor with respect 
to "material or information of which [the prosecutor] has knowledge." Utah R. Crim. P. 
16(a) (emphasis added). Here, there is no evidence that the prosecutor in fact knew before 
trial that Jill could positively identify defendant. Indeed, the record suggests otherwise. On 
direct examination the prosecutor never asked Jill if she could positively identify defendant 
(R. 224:66). Rather, he asked only whether the defendant "fit the general description of the 
person that [Jill] saw on the date of the robbery" (R. 224:66). It was not until re-direct 
examination that the prosecutor directly asked Jill if she could identify the defendant (R. 
224:81-82). That question came only after Jill revealed, in response to defendant's questions 
on cross-examination, that she had difficulty identifying anyone at the lineup because the 
participants had their hoods up (R. 224:78,79-81). Thus, all indications from the record are 
that the prosecutor did not know until cross-examination that Jill might be able to identify 
defendant.11 
1
 Although Jill stated on cross-examination that she informed the prosecutor on the 
morning of trial that the robber did not have his hood on during the robbery, there is no 
indication from her testimony that she ever told the prosecutor that she could now 
positively identify defendant (R. 224:78). As stated, the fact that the prosecutor initially 
only asked if defendant "fit the general characteristics" of the robber leads to the logical 
conclusion that the prosecutor did not know until cross-examination that Jill could 
identify defendant (R. 224:66). It is also significant that the trial court found no evidence 
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In sum, the prosecutor in this case did not violate rule 16(a) with respect to Jill's 
testimony because he did not know that Jill could positively identify him. Consequently, it 
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendant's motion for a mistrial or 
continuance. 
Janea's testimony. As with Jill's testimony, defendant alleges that the prosecutor 
knew the morning of trial that Janea would be able to positively identify him, even though 
she had been unable to do so at the lineup. Defendant renews his argument that the 
prosecutor was obligated to immediately inform him of this "change" in Janea's anticipated 
testimony. 
As with all of defendant's claims, this argument rests on a false factual premise. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, Janea did identify him at the lineup when she placed his 
number on the back of her blue card (R. 224:104-05; Add. B at 23). Although placing the 
number on the back of the card indicated some hesitancy, Janea explained that in fact she 
was quite certain of her identification at the iineup and hesitated only because the hoods were 
up and blocked her view of defendant's profile (R. 224:94-95, 98-99, 104-05). Once Janea 
saw defendant without the hood, she knew that her initial identification of him was correct 
(R. 224:95). Thus, Janea's in-court identification of defendant did not constitute a change 
from her lineup identification; it merely confirmed it. Consequently, there was no newly 
of wrong-doing by the prosecutor when it ruled on defendant's motions (R. 225:182). 
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acquired evidence for the prosecutor to disclose.12 
Because the prosecutor did not violate any discovery obligation, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motions for mistrial or continuance on the basis 
of Janea's testimony. 
C. Even assuming a discovery violation, defendant suffered no prejudice. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that a rule 16(a) violation did occur, it is clear on this 
record that defendant suffered no prejudice.13 A discovery violation constitutes reversible 
error only if, after a review of the record, there is a reasonable likelihood that but for the 
violation there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant. Knight, 734 P.2d 
12Given Janea's pretrial identification of him, defendant cannot reasonably claim 
surprise at her subsequent in-court identification. Defendant had been on notice for over 
a year before trial that Janea could identify him. The only question was the degree of 
certainty Janea felt when she identified defendant at the lineup. Defendant erroneously 
assumed that erasing the "0" on the front and writing the "2" on the back meant that Janea 
was unable to identify defendant with any kind of certainty. However, had defendant 
interviewed Janea before trial, as did the prosecutor, he would have discovered that Janea 
actually felt quite certain of her lineup identification and that if the hoods had been 
removed, she could have given "a hundred percent identification" (R. 224:95). This 
would have alerted him that Janea's identification was stronger than he had assumed and 
that she likely would be able to identify him in court. Thus, if there was any "surprise"to 
defendant, it did not result any failure by the prosecutor to comply with rule 16(a), but 
from his own failure to make a reasonable investigation. See Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143 
(holding under rule 16(a) that although prosecutor should have corrected his partially 
inaccurate witness summaries, trial court did not err in allowing witnesses to testify 
because defendant could have readily discovered the misstated evidence by interviewing 
the witnesses). 
13For the reasons stated above the State does not concede that any discovery 
violation occurred. It is merely assuming a violation for the purpose of arguing a lack of 
prejudice. 
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at 920. A "mere possibility" of a different outcome is not enough; rather, "the likelihood of 
a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id 
Moreover, to prevail on a claim of prejudice for a rule 16 discovery violation, the defendant 
must first make a credible argument that his defense was impaired by the prosecutor's failure 
to timely disclose the requested material. Id at 921. Only then does the State have the 
burden to persuade the court that absent the discovery violation, there is not a reasonable 
likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been favorable for the defendant. Id. 
1. Defendant has not made a credible argument that any alleged violation impaired 
his defense. 
Here, defendant has not made a credible argument that the prosecutor's alleged failure 
to tell him that Jill and Janea could positively identify him impaired his defense. Defendant's 
defense below was that he could not have committed the robbery because he was either 
having breakfast with Philip Hollen or home smoking at the time of the robbery (R. 224:43-
44; 225:204-08, 211,213-14, 243). Defendant does not explain on appeal how this alibi 
defense would have changed if the prosecutor had immediately informed him the morning 
of trial that Jill and Janea could positively identify him. Br. Aplt. 13-14. Nor does he 
suggest that had the prosecutor given him this information that he would have abandoned his 
alibi defense or presented a different defense. Br. Aplt. 13-14. See State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 
260, 265 (Utah App. 1998) (defendant failed to show prejudice resulted from discovery 
violation where she did not explain how trial would have been conducted differently absent 
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the violation or how undisclosed information would have significantly affected verdict). 
Instead, defendant merely asserts that the women's unforeseen in-court identifications 
unfairly prejudiced him because he had "centered [his defense] around the idea that no one 
could positively and credibly identify [him] as being involved in the crime." Br. Aplt. 13-14. 
That assertion, however, erroneously assumes that none of the witnesses could positively 
identify defendant. In fact, as defendant recognized in his opening statement (R. 224:39,41), 
two eyewitnesses other than Jill and Janea had made pretrial identifications of defendant: 
Charming Jones positively identified defendant from a photo array only a few weeks after the 
robbery (R. 224:161-63, 164: 225:194-95, 197) and Oscar Contreras positively identified 
defendant without objection both at the preliminary hearing and at trial (R. 224:122). 
Moreover, although defendant questioned the certainty of Janea's lineup identification, he 
was well aware that she had at least tentatively identified him (R. 224:42). Defendant's 
defense therefore could not have been centered around the absence of witnesses who could 
positively and credibly identify him. Therefore, the fact that he did not anticipate Jill's and 
Janea's in-court identifications could not have had any appreciable impact on how he 
presented his alibi defense. Indeed, defendant's real complaint here is not that he was 
precluded from or hampered in presenting his defense, but that the State's case turned out to 
be stronger than he had hoped. 
Defendant alternatively asserts that had he known Jill and Janea would identify him 
at trial, he would have prepared better to cross-examine them regarding their previous 
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inability to positively identify him or he would have moved to exclude their identification 
of him as unreliable under State v. Ramirez.14 Br. Aplt. 15-16. Defendant contends that a 
continuance, if granted, would have given him the necessary time both to prepare his cross-
examination of the women and to move to exclude their testimony. Br. Aplt. 17 
Defendant is precluded from raising these claims on appeal because he did not raise 
them below. State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332,335 (Utah 1993); State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 
1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 890 
P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995). Defendant asked the trial court for a continuance only to allow him 
"find and call a qualified expert to testify about the effect of pretrial corporal identification" 
(R. 225:183). Defendant said nothing about needing more time to prepare for cross-
examination or to file a Ramirez motion (R. 225:182-83). Having based his request for a 
continuance on one ground below, defendant may not now seek a reversal of the trial court's 
ruling on entirely different grounds.15 See State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358,360-31 (Utah App. 
1993) (defendant not permitted to argue that statute was unconstitutionally overbroad where 
only challenge to statute below was on equal protection and due process grounds). 
In any event, both these claims fail on the merits. Defendant has not shown that he 
14State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 778-81 (Utah 1991) held that due process under 
the Utah Constitution requires the exclusion of unreliable eyewitness testimony at the 
request of defendant. 
15Defendant has abandoned his claim that he needed a continuance to find an 
expert by not arguing that ground on appeal. 
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was not adequately prepared to cross-examine Jill and Janea regarding their in-court 
identifications. The record reflects that he thoroughly questioned Jill about her prior inability 
to identify him and the fact that during the robbery she was unable to see the robber's eyes 
because he was wearing dark glasses (R. 224:80-8l;82-83). He also thoroughly explored 
with Janea the fact that she initially could not distinguish between defendant and another man 
in the lineup and that she showed hesitancy in making the lineup identification by writing the 
number on the back (R. 224:103-06). Defendant has not specified what other questions he 
should have asked them or how he would have conducted his cross-examination differently 
had he known before that they would identify him in court. Br. Aplt. 17. Absent a specific 
allegation of how his cross-examination would have been materially different or would 
elicited testimony likely to have affected the outcome, defendant cannot show that the 
alleged discovery violation impaired his defense.16 
Similarly, there is no merit to defendant's claim that absent the alleged violation he 
would have brought a Ramirez motion and that a continuance would have given him the 
opportunity to do so. The purpose of a Ramirez motion is to exclude eyewitness 
identification that is inherently unreliable. See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778-79. Such a motion, 
therefore, is necessarily a pretrial motion. See, e.g.. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 777 (motion to 
l6Although defendant asserts that a continuance would have provided him the 
opportunity to better prepared for cross-examination, Br. Aplt. 17, he does not explain 
how that would be so given that his motion for a continuance was made after he cross-
examined both the women and after both had been excused without objection. He does 
not suggest that he planned to recall them. 
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suppress showup identification as unreliable made pretrial); State v. Severance, 828 P.2d 
1066,1068 (Utah App. 1992) (motion to suppress showup identification made before trial). 
Defendant asserts that he did not know that he needed to make a Ramirez motion because he 
did not know that Jill and Janea could identify him. Br. Aplt. 17-18. That claim, however, 
is insupportable. As stated, defendant knew that Janea had tentatively identified him at the 
lineup. Thus, any reliability questions about her identification were manifested well before 
trial. Defendant was also aware of reliability issues with respect to Channing's and Oscar's 
identifications. Channing Jones had identified defendant from a photo array, but could not 
identify him later at the lineup; Oscar Contreras identified him at the preliminary hearing, 
but could not positively identify him at the lineup. Nevertheless, defendant failed to bring 
a Ramirez motion with regard to their testimony. If defendant's goal was to exclude any 
positive identification of him from trial, he could and should have made a pretrial Ramirez 
motion with respect to all the eyewitnesses. His failure to make such a motion with respect 
to any of the witnesses had nothing to do with the prosecutor's alleged failure to tell him that 
Janea and Jill might identify him at trial. 
More important, though, is that a Ramirez motion if made would most certainly have 
been denied because both Jill's and Janea's identifications of defendant were sufficiently 
reliable. Both Jill and Janea had ample opportunity, several minutes in fact, to view both 
robbers during the event (R. 224:47,61,70-71,73,89-90,91); both gave general descriptions 
of the blond robber that were consistent with other the descriptions of other witnesses and 
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that remained consistent for two and a half years (224:50, 76-77, 90, 95, 99-100, 114-15, 
129; 225:185, 187-88; Defendant's Exhibit 19); any hesitancy or inability in identifying 
defendant at the lineup was reasonably explained by the fact that the lineup participants all 
wore hoods; finally, there was no evidence that either identification was the product of 
suggestion. See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781 (holding that reliability of eyewitness 
identification must be determined under totality of circumstances, considering such factors 
as opportunity of witness to view actor during event; witness's degree of attention to actor 
during event; witness's capacity to observe, including physical and mental acuity; whether 
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter; whether 
identification was product of suggestion; and likelihood that witness would perceive, 
remember and relate event correctly under the circumstances). 
Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court in Ramirez affirmed the admission of an 
eyewitness identification far less reliable and subject to far more suggestibility than either 
Jill's or Janea's identifications. There, the victim witness of a robbery viewed the suspect 
for only a few seconds during a scuffle. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 782. The witness was then 
asked to identify the defendant at a showup late at night about 30 minutes after the crime. 
Id. at 784. The witness, who was seated in the back of a police cruiser, viewed the 
defendant, who was cuffed to a chain link fence and who had the headlights of several police 
cars trained on him. IdL at 784. If the showup identification in Ramirez was sufficiently 
reliable for admission, surely both Jill's and Janea's identifications were also admissible. 
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In short, defendant has not and cannot show that his defense was impaired by any 
alleged violation of the prosecutor. 
2. Defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged violations. 
Even if defendant could show that his defense suffered some impairment, there is 
simply no basis on this record for a finding that defendant suffered any prejudice from the 
unanticipated identifications. As stated, the two women were not the only witnesses who 
identified defendant. Channing Jones identified defendant and his accomplice from a photo 
array within weeks of the robbery (R. 224:161-63, 164; 225:192, 193-94, 197). Oscar 
Contreras positively identified defendant at both the preliminary hearing and at trial without 
objection (R. 224:122). Although Oscar was uncertain regarding his identification of 
defendant at the lineup, he narrowed his choices to defendant and one other person (R. 
224:41; Add. B at 23). The most significant evidence of defendant's guilt, however, was his 
own alibi, that at the time of the robbery, he was with Philip Hollen, the man whom 
Channing, Oscar, and Lou Livolsi had positively identified as the other robber (R. 225:204, 
205, 206, 207). Viewed together, these facts, along with Janea's tentative identification of 
defendant at the lineup, provide overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Thus, even if 
Jill and Janea had been unable to positively identify defendant at trial, there is no reasonable 
likelihood that he would have been acquitted. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
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Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1998) 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continu-
ance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(continued on next page) 
Rule 16 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the 
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance 
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear 
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for 
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused 
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem 
appropriate. 
ADDENDUM B 
Defendant's Exhibit 17 
"Transcript of Lineup" 
1 (WITNESSES FOR CASE #951000532 BROUGHT INTO THE 
2 PROCEEDINGS. ) 
3 (BACK ON THE RECORD.) 
4 I MR. D'ALESANDRO: OKAY, READY. 
5 MR. SHEPHERD: YEAH, BRING THEM IN. 
6 MS. BOWMAN: HAS THE RECORD REFLECTED THAT THEY 
7 ARE OUT? 
8 THE COURT REPORTER: YES. 
9 MR. SHEPHERD: NOW, IF YOU WOULD, SIT A SEAT 
10 APART JUST LIKE IF YOU WERE TAKING A TEST SO YOU CAN'T LOOK ON 
11 YOUR -- THE TEST RESULTS OF SOMEBODY ELSE. 
12 I I'M GOING TO GIVE YOU A BLUE CARD HERE -- EACH 
13 ONE OF YOU -- AND A PENCIL. AS YOU'LL SEE THERE'S A PLACE TO 
14 PUT YOUR NAME UP AT THE TOP AND THE DATE. 
15 NOW, AS YOU'LL NOTE, IT INDICATES ON THE CARD: 
16 IF YOU RECOGNIZE THE PERSON WHO COMMITTED THE CRIME, IF YOU 
17 WOULD PUT THE NUMBER -- AND YOU'LL SEE THE NUMBERS UP HERE ON 
18 THE STAGE; THERE WILL BE SOMEBODY STANDING OVER THOSE 
19 NUMBERS -- IF YOU'LL PUT THE NUMBER IN THE BOX AT THE BOTTOM 
20 OF THE CARD. 
21 IF YOU DO NOT RECOGNIZE ANYONE IN THE LINEUP, IF 
22 YOU'LL PUT A "0." 
23 IF YOU THINK YOU RECOGNIZE THE PERSON, BUT YOU'RE 
24 NOT SURE, WOULD YOU WRITE THAT NUMBER ON THE BACK OF THE CARD? 
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THEN STAND SO YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT THEM. 
NOW, DID EACH OP YOU -- DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTU-
NITY IN THIS CASE -- WERE YOU SHOWN PHOTOGRAPHS? 
(MR. CONTRERAS AND MR. JONES RESPOND IN THE AFFIRMA-
TIVE. ) 
MR. SHEPHERDt IS THERE ANYONE HERE THAT 
WASN'T? 
(MR. LIVOLSI, MR. PETERSON, MS. PITTMAN AND MS. SEAGER 
RESPOND IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.) 
MR. SHEPHERD* YOU HAVE NOT SEEN PHOTOGRAPHS; 
FOUR PEOPLE. 
THOSE OF YOU WHO WERE SHOWN PHOTOGRAPHS, WOULD 
YOU INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS? 
(MR. CONTRERAS AND MR. JONES RAISE THEIR HANDS.) 
MR. SHEPHERD: WHAT IS YOUR NAME? 
MR. CONTRERAS. OSCAR CONTRERAS. 
MR. SHEPHERD* HOW MANY TIMES DID YOU LOOK AT 
PHOTOGRAPHS? 
MR. CONTRERAS* TWO DIFFERENT TIMES, I THINK. 
MR. SHEPHERD* WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME? 
MR. CONTRERAS* I DON'T KNOW. ABOUT TWO, THREE 
MONTHS. 
MR. SHEPHERD* HOW LONG --
MR. CONTRERAS* THE LAST TIME THE DETECTIVE 
CALLED ME I WENT UP TO THAT WHITE BUILDING AND WE WENT UP AND 
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HE SHOWED ME SOME PHOTOGRAPHS AND I POINTED HIM OUT; THE ONE 
THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS THE ONE. 
MR. SHEPHERD: OKAY. AND THAT WAS SEVERAL 
MONTHS AGO? 
MR. CONTRERAS: I GUESS. 
MR. SHEPHERDi AND YOUR NAME? 
MR. JONES. CHANNING JONES. 
MR. SHEPHERD: OKAY, CHANNING, I'M GLAD TO SEE 
YOU GOT HERE. APPARENTLY THE PAGER DIDN'T WORK. 
MR. JONES: IT WENT OFF. 
MR. SHEPHERD: DID IT GO OFF? 
MR. JONES: YES. 
MR. SHEPHERD: OKAY. 
MR. JONES: YEAH. 
MR. SHEPHERD: IT SAID THAT WE WEREN'T 
CONNECTED. 
WHEN WERE YOU SHOWN PHOTOGRAPHS? 
MR. JONES: ABOUT A YEAR AGO. 
MR. SHEPHERD: JUST ONE TIME OR MORE THAN ONCE? 
MR. JONES: ONCE. 
MR. SHEPHERD: ANYONE ELSE? 
(NO RESPONSE FROM THE WITNESSES.) 
MR. SHEPHERD: OKAY, THANKS. ANYBODY HAVE ANY 
QUESTIONS? 
(NO RESPONSE FROM THE WITNESSES.) 
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MR. SHEPHERD: OKAY. WE'LL GO AHEAD AND BRING 
IN THEN AND TURN OUT THE LIGHTS. 
THEY WON'T BE ABLE TO SEE YOU FROM THE STAGE. 
LINEUP PARTICIPANTS BROUGHT BACK INTO THE PROCEEDINGS.) 
MR. SHEPHERD: OKAY, BRING THEM OUT SAME ORDER. 
THANK YOU. 
NO. 1, WILL YOU PLEASE STEP FORWARD? 
TURN TO YOUR LEFT. 
WALK TO THE END. 
WILL YOU WALK BACK? 
WILL YOU TURN AND FACE ME? 
STEP BACK, PLEASE. 
THANK YOU. 
NO. 2, WOULD YOU STEP FORWARD? 
TURN TO YOUR LEFT. 
WALK TO THE END OF THE STAGE. 
WILL YOU WALK BACK, PLEASE? 
TURN AND FACE ME. 
STEP BACK, PLEASE. 
THANK YOU. 
NO. 3, WOULD YOU STEP FORWARD, PLEASE? 
TURN TO YOUR LEFT. 
WALK TO THE END OF THE STAGE. 
WILL YOU WALK BACK, PLEASE? 
TURN AND FACE ME. 
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STEP BACK, PLEASE. 
NO. 4, WILL YOU STEP FORWARD, PLEASE? 
TURN TO YOUR LEFT. 
WALK TO THE END OF THE STAGE. 
WALK BACK, PLEASE. 
TURN AND FACE ME. 
STEP BACK, PLEASE. 
NO. 5, WILL YOU STEP FORWARD, PLEASE? 
TURN TO YOUR RIGHT. 
WALK TO THE END OF THE STAGE. 
WALK BACK. 
TURN AND FACE ME. 
ALL RIGHT. STEP BACK. 
THANK YOU. 
NO. 6, WILL YOU STEP FORWARD, PLEASE? 
TURN TO YOUR RIGHT. 
WALK TO THE END. 
WILL YOU WALK BACK, PLEASE? 
WILL YOU TURN AND FACE ME? 
STEP BACK, PLEASE. 
NO. 7, WILL YOU STEP FORWARD, PLEASE? 
TURN TO YOUR RIGHT. 
WALK TO THE END. 
WALK BACK, PLEASE. 
WILL YOU TURN AND FACE ME, PLEASE? 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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STEP BACK, PLEASE. 
THANK YOU. 
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WOULD YOU PRINT YOUR NAMES UNDER 


































: OSCAR CONTRERAS. 





JONES: CHANNING JONES. 
SHEPHERD: ALL RIGHT. THANK 
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IN. YOU CAN ALL BE EXCUSED TODAY. AS YOU KNOW, WE'VE GOT ONE 
MORE SET TOMORROW AND THAT WILL DO IT, AND THEN WE'LL BE DONE 
WITH THIS. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMING IN. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 
YOU CAN LEAVE. 
MR. D'ALESANDROt CAN I HAVE MISS PITTMAN AND 
MR. LIVOLSI STAY FOR A MINUTE JUST OUTSIDE? 
(WITNESSES TAKEN OUT OF THE PROCEEDINGS.) 
MR. SHEPHERD* WE HAVE -- LET'S SEE, CHANNING 
JONES; THERE'S NOTHING INDICATED ON THE FRONT. NUMBER "3" IS 
INDICATED ON THE BACK. 
DAVID PETERSON; NOTHING ON THE FRONT. NUMBER "5" 
IS INDICATED ON THE BACK. 
OSCAR CONTRERAS; NOTHING INDICATED ON THE FRONT. 
NUMBER "2" AND NUMBER "7" ON THE BACK. 
JILL PITTMAN; NOTHING INDICATED ON THE FRONT. 
NUMBER "5" ON THE BACK. 
LOU LIVOLSI, A "0" INDICATED ON THE FRONT. 
MS. BOWMAN: NOTHING ON THE BACK? 
MR. SHEPHERD: NO. 
AND JANEA SEAGER; NUMBER "2" ON THE BACK. 
DID YOU GET ALL THOSE? 
THE COURT REPORTER: YES. 
MR. SHEPHERD: THANK YOU. 
MS. BOWMAN: WE'RE DONE. 
MR. SHEPHERD: YEAH, WE'LL INDICATE THAT 
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1 THERE'S NOTHING FURTHER AS FAR AS THIS LINEUP GOES, AND WE 
2 WILL CONCLUDE IT AT THIS TIME. 
3 1 (WHEREUPON THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED AT 2:15 P.M.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
SS. 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE LINEUP PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
CASES OF THE STATE OF UTAH VS. JEFFERY DEVON MECHAM, CASE 
#951000532 AND CASE #951000606, TAKEN OCTOBER 16, 1996, WERE 
TAKEN BEFORE ME, VICKI R. BOS, A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
AND NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, RESIDING AT 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED BY ME IN STENOTYPE, 
AND THEREAFTER CAUSED BY ME TO BE TRANSCRIBED, TO THE BEST OF 
MY ABILITY, INTO TYPEWRITING. THAT A FULL, TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID PROCEEDINGS SO TAKEN AND TRANSCRIBED IS 
SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING PAGES NUMBERED FROM PAGE 4 TO 24 
INCLUSIVE. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT OF KIN OR OTHERWISE 
ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE PARTIES TO SAID CAUSE OF ACTION, 
AND THAT I AM NOT INTERESTED IN THE EVENT THEREOF. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL AT SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, THIS £-fh DAY OF DECEMBER, 1997. 
t/cU. 7? /L~-
VICKI R. BOS, C.S.R.*, R.P.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
NOVEMBER 7TH, 2000 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
VICKI R. 80S 
3840 So. 2300 E. 
S.LC, UT 84109 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
NOV. 7. 2000 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TEN EXCHANGE PLACE, SUITE 322 




Partial Transcript of Janea Jones' Testimony 
1 Q When they left did they both leave together? 
2 A I think so. When they left, I started bawling. 
3 Q And how were you able to get out of the wrist 
4 restraints? 
5 A I picked up some scissors from the counter and I 
6 cut Lou's cuffs off and then Lou cut mine off. 
7 Q Do you know whether or not anyone reported this 
8 immediately? 
9 A Jill or Dave, I can't remember which one. I think 
10 one was holding the phone and the other one was dialing, did 
11 it while they were still tied up, and called the cops. 
12 Q Now, later on you talked with police officers. 
13 How long after did you talk to the police officers? 
14 A It seemed like it was a couple of hours. 
15 Q And you gave a description at that time? 
16 A I did. 
17 Q Did you ever look at photographs of the persons? 
18 A I didn't. 
19 Q And did you later attend a lineup? 
20 A I did. 
21 Q At the lineup were you able to make an 
22 identification? 
23 A I did. 
24 Q Now, did you have any problems at the lineup? 
25 A The only problem I had is that they had hoods on. 
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1 If they would have taken their hoods off, I could have given 
2 a hundred percent identification. But I did put on the back 
3 just who I thought it was just from the front view because I 
4 didn't have a lot of profile view. 
5 Q During the time of the robbery, they did not have 
6 the hood up; is that correct? 
7 A Not when I saw them. 
8 Q Do you see the person involved in that robbery in 
9 the courtroom today? 
10 A Yes, I do. 
11 Q Would you indicate to the jury where he is seated? 
12 A He is right there. 
13 Q Would you describe what he is wearing. 
14 A He is wearing a navy blue shirt, khaki pants, navy 
15 blue socks, tan shoes. 
16 MR. SHEPHERD: May the record reflect that she has 
17 indicated the defendant. 
18 THE COURT: Yes, it may. 
19 MR. SHEPHERD: No further questions. 
20 THE COURT: All right. You may cross examine. 
21 CROSS EXAMINATION 
22 BY MR. WALL: 
23 Q Were any nickels taken? 
24 A Nickels? 
25 Q Nickels. 
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1 two because I had seen them both. 
2 Q And with regard to who you could identify, you 
3 indicated that you could identify the fat one, you marked 
4 block No. 9 on the second page with a "yes," and you 
5 indicated specifically, "the fat one." Correct? 
6 A I thought I would be able to identify the fat one 
7 more likely than the other one. I had looked at him longer 
8 than the other one, which I had looked at the other one, 
9 also. 
10 Q Then you attended the lineup? 
11 A When I attended the lineup, I was more certain of 
12 myself. 
13 Q You attended the lineup about a little over a year 
14 later; is that correct? 
15 A Yes, I did. 
16 Q And at the lineup you were given a blue card; is 
17 that correct? 
18 A I was. 
19 Q I am going to hand you what's been previously 
20 marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 17 and ask you to take a 
21 look at what I'll ask to be marked as Defense Exhibit No. 20. 
22 Do you recognize what's been marked as Defense 
23 Exhibit No. 20? 
24 A Yes, I do. 

















2 A Yes, it was. 
3 Q And that blue card is dated as of the date of the 
4 lineup, correct? 
5 A Yes. 
And at the lineup you reviewed the card, correct? 
What? 
You reviewed the card, correct? 
Reviewed it? 
You read the card. 
Oh. Yes, I did. 
And it indicated if you recognized the person, 
13 that you should put the number for that person in the box on 
14 the face of the card. Correct? 
15 A Uh-huh. 
16 Q And if you did not recognize the person or 
17 whatever, you were to put a zero in the box. Correct? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Then also if you were not sure but you thought you 
20 recognized that person, you were to put that number on the 
21 back. Correct? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q And you initially put a zero in the box and then 
24 erased it, correct? 
25 A I initially did. At first I couldn't tell between 
1 2 and 7. But then when I looked a little bit longer, it was 
2 2. 
3 Q But nonetheless, you did put a zero in the box, 
4 correct? 
5 A On my initial look until I relooked through. If 
6 they would have taken off their hoods, I could have given a 
7 positive identification. But I wasn't sure if we were 
8 allowed to ask them to do so. 
9 Q Now, you read the entire card before you made any 
10 marks on the card, correct? 
11 A I believe we read them before they came out. 
12 Q So you knew if you did not recognize the person, 
13 you were to put a zero in the box? 
14 A Yes, I did. 
15 Q And that meant that you did not recognize any 
16 person in the lineup, correct? 
17 A No. I did recognize two of them, and I wasn't 
18 sure until I took a second look. And I didn't want to 
19 falsely accuse anyone if I wasn't sure, so I was going to put 
20 a zero. So when I looked again, I could tell it was No. 2. 
21 Q Now, the blue card said, 
22 "If you are not sure, but THINK you may recognize 
23 any person participating in the lineup as the 
24 individual involved in the crime, leave the 
25 square blank and mark their number on the back." 
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1 Correct? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q So if you were uncertain, you would just simply 
4 write down the two individuals you thought might be the 
5 person, correct? 
6 A I only wrote down the one individual when I 
7 realized it. But I still put it on the back because I was 
8 worried about falsely accusing someone, even though I knew 
9 who it was, because I didn't want to make a mistake I guess. 
10 Q But you knew before you marked on the card that if 
11 you thought you might recognize two people, you could mark 
12 the two on the back? 
13 A No, I did not. I did not know you could mark two 
14 on the back. 
15 Q Has anybody talked with you about who you 
16 identified on the blue card? 
17 A Who I identified on the blue card? We talked 
18 about it when we were walking out. A lot of people said they 
19 thought it was 2 or 7. And they said, I thought so, too. 
20 But I made my decision that it was No. 2, and I said that's 
21 what I thought, too. 
22 Q Who did you talk to? 
23 A Oscar, I believe, or it could have been Channing. 
24 Q You say a lot of people thought it was 2 or 7? 
25 A I just think it might have been me and Oscar that 
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1 thought it was 2 or 7, but we both came to the conclusion 
2 that was 2. I mean, when you get those people up, they try 
3 and get the most similar people up to looking like him. So 
4 you have to know who you are looking for in order to identify 
5 the correct person. 
6 Q Didn't you testify earlier that you talked to a 
7 lot of people about who they identified? 
8 A A lot of people who they had identified? I know 
9 on the next day everyone identified 6. I don't know who they 
10 identified on the first day — or 1 guess it was the second 
11 one. 
12 Q So you compared who you identified with Oscar? 
13 A This was after we left, so I had already done it. 
14 It was after I had wrote this down. We didn't get to talk to 
15 each other while we were in there. 
16 Q But you compared who you identified with Oscar? 
17 A Yeah, I did. 
18 Q And did you compare who you identified with 
19 Channing Jones? 
20 A It was one of the two. I'm not sure if it was one 
21 or the other. I said that because I said that I was, I 
22 thought it was No. 2. 
23 Q Did you compare who you identified with Jill 
24 Roberts? 
25 A No, I didn't. 
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1 Q Did you compare who you identified with anybody 
2 else? 
3 A I don't believe so. This was over a year ago. I 
4 could be wrong. I don't believe so. I guess I should have 
5 brought a tape recorder with me to see what I did afterwards. 
6 Q Did there come a time after the lineup that you 
7 spoke with investigators about who you identified? 
8 A No, I didn't. 
9 Q And did there come a time after the lineup that 
10 you spoke with the prosecutor about who you had identified? 
11 A Today. 
12 Q And was that before court? 
13 A It was. He asked me if I could identify the man 
14 that I had seen in here as being the suspect, because I told 
15 him the only thing I was unsure of was the hood being on. 
16 Q And did he show you a photograph of the person? 
17 A No, he didn't. I had seen him when we came over 
18 here for juror selection. 
19 Q So, the prosecutor brought you over and you sat in 
20 here and looked at the person who was on trial here? 
21 A I did. That's when I got the profile view that I 
22 wanted at the initial — whatever — lineup. 
23 MR. WALL: No further questions, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Very well. 
25 Any redirect? 
108 
ADDENDUM D 
Partial Transcript of Jill Pittman's Testimony 
1 Q How long was it before you were able to get the 
2 wrist restraints off? 
3 A It was immediately after we hung up the phone• 
4 While we were calling, there were other people because there 
5 were a few people in the room that were ripping the wrist 
6 restraints off each other. And after I was on the phone 
7 somebody ripped mine off. 
8 Q Now, you have seen the defendant, Mr. Mecham, in 
9 the courtroom here today. How does he fit the general 
10 description of the person that you saw on the date of the 
11 robbery? 
12 A Well, his hair is a bit shorter. He is clean 
13 shaven. He's a little heavier than two and a half years ago. 
14 But basic characteristics, he fits exactly. 
15 MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you. I have no further 
16 questions of this witness. 
17 THE COURT: All right. 
18 You may cross examine, Mr. Wall. 
19 CROSS EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. WALL: 
21 Q Did you meet with Mr. Shepherd before you 
22 testified today? 
23 A Yes, I did. 
24 Q When did you meet with him? 
25 A At 9:30. 
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1 Q What did you review with him? 
2 A The day it happened and the photographs. We just 
3 went through the photographs, what they were pictures of. 
4 Q So he was showing you a set of photographs? 
5 A Um-hum. 
6 Q Did they include photographs of people? 
7 A No. 
8 Q The photographs that you saw, were they the 
9 photographs that were shown to you as the State's Exhibits 
10 Nos. 1 through 15? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And you had never seen those photographs prior to 
13 today? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Some of the photographs show a large bag in front 
16 of one of the doors. Do you recall seeing that? 
17 A No, I don't. If you have the pictures, I'll look 
18 at them again. 
19 Q I ask you to take a look at State's Exhibits, I 
20 believe, 4, 5 and 6. Do you recognize those? 
21 A The bag that's holding the door open? 
22 Q Well, there is a door in each of those pictures, 
23 correct? 
24 A Yes — no — yeah, there is. 
25 Q It's the same door, correct? 
1 Q And you recall seeing this person with a gun, 
2 correct? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q But you didn't see the gun that that person had 
5 very well. Isn't that right? 
6 A Well, I didn't see it well enough to tell you 
7 specifics about what was on the gun, no. I saw a gun, a 
8 black, small gun. 
9 Q Now, the other individual, how tall was the person 
10 that you recall seeing? 
11 A About five — I'm trying to think. I am five, 
12 four. So about five, seven maybe. Five, nine. 
13 Q How heavy was the person approximately? 
14 A About 170 pounds. He was skinnier than the other 
15 guy, the way I can describe it. I can't describe it in 
16 pounds. 
17 Q Which of the two individuals, the heavier or the 
18 lighter person, was wearing a sweat shirt? 
19 A The lighter person. 
20 Q What was the other person wearing? 
21 A I don't recall. I believe it was a T-shirt but I 
22 don't recall. The guy with the blond hair was wearing the 
23 sweat shirt. 
24 Q And you testified earlier that this sweat shirt 
25 had a hood? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q And did that person have their hood over their 
3 head? 
4 A No, they did not. 
5 Q Could you see their hair? 
6 A Yes. It was blond. 
7 Q Was that person wearing glasses? 
8 A Dark sunglasses. 
9 Q Was that person wearing a mustache? 
10 A No. But he was a little unshaven. 
11 Q Now, when the lineup occurred, you were given a 
12 blue card. Do you recall that? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And on the blue card, if you recognized the person 
15 that committed the offense as one of the people in the 
16 lineup, you were to indicate that number, correct? 
17 A I believe so. 
18 Q And you were to write that number in a little box 
19 on the front of the card, correct? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Now, when the people came in in the lineup, you 
22 looked at them, correct? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And you couldn't recognize any one of them as 
25 being a person that had been at Raging Waters, correct? 
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1 A Is that what my blue card says? If that's what it 
2 says — this happened a while ago. You'll have to bear with 
3 me. I don't remember exactly what I wrote down on every 
4 single witness report or on the blue card. I know it was 
5 difficult for me because in the lineup they had all these 
6 gentlemen wear their hooded sweat shirts with the hat on and 
7 it was hard to recognize because that was not how I saw him. 
8 Q At the time that you were at the lineup, you 
9 didn't indicate that they didn't have a hood on, did you? 
10 A No. 
11 Q Did you ever tell Mr. Shepherd or any other 
12 investigator that the person didn't have a hood on? 
13 A Yes, I did. 
14 Q Who did you tell? 
15 A Mr. Shepherd, today. 
16 Q How about before today? 
17 A No, I did not. 
18 Q Let me hand you what I'll ask to be marked as 
19 Defense Exhibit No. 17. I am going to ask you to take a look 
20 at this page. Do you recognize what is on that page. 
21 MR. SHEPHERD: What page are we referring to? 
22 MR. WALL: It's just my page for the lineup 
23 identification. I signed and printed my name and dated it, 
24 October 16th of '96. 
25 Q That's the blue card that you had at that time, 
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1 correct? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And on the face of that blue card, does that 
4 appear to be in the same condition as the card that you left 
5 on that date? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Could you look at the back of the blue card. Does 
8 that appear to be in the same condition as it was on the date 
9 that you looked at it? 
10 A Yes. 
11 MR. WALL: At this time I'll move for the admission 
12 of Defense Exhibit No. 17. 
13 MR. SHEPHERD: Is counsel moving for admission of 
14 the card, itself? 
15 MR. WALL: I am moving for admission of the entire 
16 thing. If you want me to narrow it and have the card 
17 removed — 
18 MR. SHEPHERD: We have the entire transcript of the 
19 lineup there. I will object to that. 
20 THE COURT: I'll take under advisement the entire 
21 Exhibit. I'll receive this aspect of it, which is this young 
22 lady's blue card. 
23 MR. WALL: Your Honor, would you like to have it 
24 removed? 
25 THE COURT: No. It isn't necessary at this time 
1 unless you plan to show it to the jury. Then we will. 
2 MR. WALL: I would like to do that. 
3 THE COURT: Is there an objection to the card, 
4 itself? 
5 MR. SHEPHERD: No, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Let's then take it out of your pamphlet 
7 and have it marked separately and we'll receive it as a 
8 separate exhibit. 
9 MR. WALL: Your Honor, may the record reflect that 
10 I am removing Defense Exhibit No. 18 from Defense Exhibit 
11 No. 17. Since this is an original document, I think I best 
12 put it in the record. 
13 Q (By Mr. Wall) Other than the tape that is 
14 attached to the top of that card, is that your card? 
15 A Yes, it is. 
16 Q On October 16th of 1996, with regard to the people 
17 that were before you in the lineup, you did not recognize 
18 anyone in that lineup as a person that was at Raging Waters 
19 that day and committing the robbery? 
20 A It doesn't look like it. It says if you think but 
21 you're not sure, put the number on the back. And that's what 
22 I did. 
23 Q And on the back you indicated a number for a 
24 person that you thought might be similar? 
25 A Right. Because, like I said, it was very hard to 
1 tell with the hoods up* 
2 Q And you indicated that that was the individual 
3 whose person was numbered, "5.M Correct? 
4 A Urn-hum. 
5 Q And you did not indicate the number M2" any place 
6 on the card, did you? 
7 A No. 
8 MR. WALL: No further questions, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Is there any redirect? 
10 MR. SHEPHERD: Just briefly, your Honor. 
11 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. SHEPHERD: 
13 Q You had not discussed what was going to happen in 
14 the lineup before it happened. Is that correct? 
No, I had not. 
You were hauled in and observed these gentlemen on 
Right. 
Was each of these persons wearing a sweat shirt? 
Yes. 
And each of them had a hood pulled up over their 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And each of them had dark glasses? 


















1 Q Now, as are you sitting in court here today and 
2 you have had a chance to observe the defendant, does that 
3 stir your recollection any more? 
4. A Oh, yes. 
5 Q Do you have any question now as to who that person 
6 was that committed the robbery? 
7 A No, I do not* There are certain features, such as 
8 his nose and his bones right here, his cheeks, that really 
9 make me know for sure that this was the guy that was there. 
10 MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you. No further questions. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further, 
12 Mr. Wall? 
13 MR. WALL: I have a few questions your Honor. 
14 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. WALL: 
16 Q When the two individuals were at the Raging 
17 Waters, you couldn't ever see the eyes of the person that was 
18 shorter, could you? 
19 A He was wearing dark glasses. No, I could not. 
20 Q And as far as his body, he was in a sweat suit, 
21 correct? 
22 THE COURT: Just a minute, young lady. 
23 I don't recall this having been gone into in 
24 redirect examination. 
25 MR. WALL: I am getting to physical features that 
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1 were gone into* 
2 THE COURT: Well, physical features of whom? 
3 That's the issue• 
4 MR. WALL: Of the person she identified, your 
5 Honor. 
6 THE COURT: All right. 
7 Q (By Mr. Wall) Now, you have testified that you 
8 saw his cheek bones; is that correct? 
9 A His bones right here. 
10 Q Cheek bones? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And his nose, correct? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q But you didn't say anything about the chin, 
15 correct? 
16 A No, I did not. 
17 Q And you don't recognize a similarity between the 
18 chins of the individuals that you saw, do you? 
19 A No. I mean, these bones right here do come into 
20 the chin a little bit. But the side of his face, when he 
21 looks at me, I know that it's him. 
22 Q And you are referring to the jaw? 
23 A The jaw bone, yes. 
24 Q And the cheek. 
25 A Yes. 
1 Q So you are referring to a profile you saw of the 
2 person? 
3 A No* 
4 Q A straight on? 
5 A For him, straight on. 
6 MR. WALL: No further questions, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Roberts, you are free 
8 to go. 
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
10 Call your next witness. 
11 MR. SHEPHERD: May this witness be excused, your 
12 Honor? 
13 THE COURT: Any objection? 
14 MR. WALL: No, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: You are free to go. 
16 MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you. 
17 Would you ask Janea Jones to come in, please. 
18 JANEA SEAGER JONES 
19 called as a witness for and on behalf of the plaintiff, 
20 having first been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
21 follows: 
22 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. SHEPHERD: 
24 Q Would you state your name, please* 
25 A Janea Jones. 
ADDENDUM E 
Transcript of Defendant's Motions and Trial Court's Ruling 
1 WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1 0 , 1 9 9 7 ; 9 : 1 0 A.M. 
2 T R I A L P R O C E E D I N G S f C o n t . ) 
3 
4 THE COURT: The jury is present. Good morning, 
5 members of the jury. 
6 The defendant and both counsel are present. 
7 Mr. Shepherd, you may call your next witness. 
8 MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you. 
9 MR. WALL: Your Honor, before we proceed, I have a 
10 couple of matters I need to put on the record out of the 
11 hearing of the jury. 
12 THE COURT: Why do you wait until we get the jury 
13 in to tell me that? 
14 MR. WALL: Your Honor, I was waiting for you to 
15 come in so I can bring that forward. 
16 THE COURT: Members of the jury, I will ask you to 
17 return to the jury room, and I will bring you back in as soon 
18 as we finish up the matters of law that I have to take up 
19 with counsel. 
20 (The jury exits from the courtroom). 
21 THE COURT: All right. The jury has now exited the 
22 courtroom. 
23 Mr. Wall, what do you have on your mind? 
24 MR. WALL: Your Honor, I have two motions for 
25 mistrial this morning. One is a motion for mistrial due to a 
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1 post charge pretrial identification which was put on the 
2 record as of yesterday. 
3 I laid the foundation with regard to the 
4 witnesses, that they went to a lineup where counsel was 
5 present. And at the lineups they were unable to make 
6 identification. Then it became clear through the testimony 
7 of witnesses, that yesterday morning prior to trial, 
8 particularly witness Jones, and she expressly stated that she 
9 was sent over to the courthouse to look at Mr. Mecham for 
10 purposes of identification. 
11 There was no prior notice to counsel that there 
12 was an identification occurring at the courthouse that 
13 morning. But that identification was without prior notice as 
14 is required pursuant to Utah Statute 77-8-2 and under the 
15 Rules of Discovery. And without that prior notice, it 
16 deprives my client of both his due process rights and his 
17 Sisth Amendment right to counsel at any pretrial lineup. 
18 And I base this on the case of Moore v. 
19 Illinois, a United States Supreme Court decision, in which 
20 they discussed pretrial corporal identification. 
21 I laid the foundation to establish that the 
22 witnesses at the time of the lineups that occurred on October 
23 16th of 1996, were unable to identify my client. And yet the 
24 first two witnesses who came into the Court made a positive 
25 identification. And it was clear that the identification 
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1 that they made in the court was following an identification 
2 of my client by those witnesses pursuant to the direction of 
3 the prosecution earlier that morning. 
4 That's the first motion of that I have. 
5 THE COURT: All right. What's your second motion. 
6 MR. WALL: Your Honor, the second motion has to do 
7 with the prequalified jury. I reviewed the Court file this 
8 morning. I did not find any affidavits of the jurors 
9 establishing the facts that they are statutorily qualified to 
10 sit as jurors in this case. I asked my first question with 
11 regard to statutory qualification at the beginning of the 
12 trial with regard to the ability to read, write and speak the 
13 English language, which is a statutory requirement. There 
14 are no other facts to establish the statutory qualification 
15 for the witnesses that were established during the voir dire 
16 because I was informed that they were prequalified. 
17 I looked in the court file and found that the last 
18 document filed in the court file was my motion of December 
19 1st. There are no other affidavits indicating that the 
20 jurors have the statutory qualifications for sitting as 
21 jurors to be competent jurors. And I was not provided any of 
22 affidavits at any time indicating that they were statutorily 
23 qualified. 
24 Due to that, I would at this time move that the 
25 Court find this case is in mistrial as it is necessary before 
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1 any trial go in order that there be qualifications. I 
2 inquired as to qualifications and was told that they were 
3 prequalified, but found no documentation indicating the facts 
4 that establish their qualifications. And without those 
5 qualifications being of record, there is no way for me later 
6 to evaluate whether or not they're actually qualified. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wall. 
8 Mr. Shepherd, do you wish to respond? 
9 MR. SHEPHERD: Yes. Very briefly, your Honor. 
10 With respect to the witnesses who testified and 
11 made the identifications, my recollection of the testimony of 
12 particularly the first witness was, she said that she had 
13 come over to court to be here for jury selection. They came 
14 into court for jury selection, which is often the process so 
15 that the jury can determine whether or not they are 
16 acquainted with these witnesses. 
17 Counsel knew or should have known they were in the 
18 courtroom, and he did not ask to have them removed. That is 
19 the only time they were here. They were not directed to come 
20 here for purposes of making an identification. 
21 As a matter of fact, it was only after counsel's 
22 cross examination and she indicated on the stand that she 
23 recognized him, that in redirect I asked the question of her 
24 if she could, in fact, identify him. 
25 The second witness had made a tentative 
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1 identification at the lineup. She had, in fact, identified 
2 him but was not sure when she came into court. She explained 
3 those circumstances and testified to the jury that she was at 
4 this point sure of that identification. 
5 So I would submit that this was not a pretrial 
6 lineup that was held and it was not contrived to be that. 
7 THE COURT: Very well. Counsel, the motions for 
8 mistrial are denied. I am not persuaded, based on what's 
9 been presented to me and my recollection of the testimony of 
10 the witness in question, that there was a surreptitious 
11 attempt by the prosecution to get an identification without 
12 the knowledge of defense counsel. 
13 These young ladies were in the courtroom prior to 
14 the start time of the trial. They were awaiting the 
15 selection of the jury. And I have no reason to think that 
16 Mr. Shepherd was directing them to speed over here and get a 
17 look at the defendant to identify him. That motion is 
18 denied. 
19 With regard to prequalification of the jurors, 
20 that is handled by the clerk especially assigned by the court 
21 downstairs. The jury are called in earlier and qualified at 
22 that stage. We then go through our voir dire process here in 
23 the courtroom. I rely upon the clerk's office to do their 
24 statutory duty in that regard. So your motion for 
25 disqualification of the jury is denied. 
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1 Let's bring the jury back in now, Pete. 
2 MR. WALL: Your Honor, I have one more motion. It 
3 is appropriate under the law that I move for a continuance as 
4 I was surprised to find out that the witnesses came into the 
5 courtroom, looked at my client, made the identification and 
6 then left prior to trial. And I would ask for a continuance 
7 so that I can call — so that I could find and call a 
8 qualified expert to testify about the effect of pretrial 
9 corporal identifications. 
10 MR. SHEPHERD: Your Honor, they were in the 
11 courtroom. They were going to be called yesterday morning. 
12 They were going to see him in the courtroom. It would not in 
13 any way change their testimony one way or the other. 
14 THE COURT: The motion to continue is denied. 
15 (The jury is returned to the courtroom). 
16 THE COURT: The jury has returned to the courtroom. 
17 Mr. Shepherd, you may call your next witness. 
18 MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you, your Honor. The State 
19 would call Channing Jones. 
20 CHANNING JONES 
21 called as a witness for and on behalf of the plaintiff, 
22 having first been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
23 follows: 
24 // 
25 // 
